EN 50553:2012

2003-01.Slovenski inštitut za standardizacijo. Razmnoževanje celote ali delov tega standarda ni dovoljeno.Železniške naprave - Zahteve za sposobnost vožnje tirnih vozil v primeru požaraBahnanwendungen - Anforderungen an die Fahrfähigkeit im Brandfall an Bord von BahnfahrzeugenApplications ferroviaires - Exigences en matière d’aptitude au roulement en cas d’incendie à bord des véhicules ferroviairesRailway applications - Requirements for running capability in case of fire on board of rolling stock45.060.01Železniška vozila na splošnoRailway rolling stock in general13.220.99Drugi standardi v zvezi z varstvom pred požaromOther standards related to protection against fireICS:Ta slovenski standard je istoveten z:EN 50553:2012SIST EN 50553:2012en01-april-2012SIST EN 50553:2012SLOVENSKI
STANDARD
EUROPEAN STANDARD EN 50553 NORME EUROPÉENNE
EUROPÄISCHE NORM February 2012
CENELEC European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization Comité Européen de Normalisation Electrotechnique Europäisches Komitee für Elektrotechnische Normung
Management Centre: Avenue Marnix 17, B - 1000 Brussels
© 2012 CENELEC -
All rights of exploitation in any form and by any means reserved worldwide for CENELEC members.
Ref. No. EN 50553:2012 E
ICS 13.220.50; 45.060.01
English version
Railway applications -
Requirements for running capability in case of fire on board of rolling stock
Applications ferroviaires -
Exigences en matière d’aptitude au roulement en cas d’incendie à bord des véhicules ferroviaires
Bahnanwendungen -
Anforderungen an die Fahrfähigkeit im Brandfall an Bord von Bahnfahrzeugen
This European Standard was approved by CENELEC on 2012-01-23. CENELEC members are bound to comply with the CEN/CENELEC Internal Regulations which stipulate the conditions for giving this European Standard the status of a national standard without any alteration.
Up-to-date lists and bibliographical references concerning such national standards may be obtained on application to the CEN-CENELEC Management Centre or to any CENELEC member.
This European Standard exists in three official versions (English, French, German). A version in any other language made by translation under the responsibility of a CENELEC member into its own language and notified to the CEN-CENELEC Management Centre has the same status as the official versions.
CENELEC members are the national electrotechnical committees of Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and the United Kingdom.
Existing standards and background . 27Annex B (normative)
Determination of compliance for degraded mode. 29B.1First method . 29B.2Second method . 29Annex C (informative)
Passenger & staff area detection & fire fighting . 31C.1General . 31C.2Demonstration of Fire Detection by Computational Fluid Dynamic (CFD; "Field") Modelling. 31C.3Demonstration of Fire Detection by Test . 31C.4Fire Fighting Assessment . 33Annex D (informative)
Example of an approach to CFD validation . 35Annex E (informative)
Guidance for a system function approach . 36Annex ZZ (informative)
Coverage of Essential Requirements of EC Directives . 37Bibliography . 38Figures Figure 1  Decision box flow chart . 14Figure 2  Decision box 1 flow chart . 17Figure C.1  Plan View : Standard chamber with additional fog generator . 33Figure C.2  Side View : Fog Generator and fire source . 33SIST EN 50553:2012

- 3 - EN 50553:2012 Tables Table B.1  Formulae for calculating the progression of the train . 30Table E.1  Cross-reference: system function and clauses . 36 SIST EN 50553:2012

The following dates are fixed: • latest date by which this document has to be implemented at national level by publication of an identical national standard or by endorsement (dop) 2013-01-23 • latest date by which the national standards conflicting with this document have to be withdrawn (dow) 2015-01-23 Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this document may be the subject of patent rights. CENELEC [and/or CEN] shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights. This document has been prepared under a mandate given to CENELEC by the European Commission and the European Free Trade Association and supports essential requirements of EU Directives 96/48/EC (HSR) and 2001/16/EC (CONRAIL), both recast by 2008/57/EC (RAIL). For the relationship with EU Directive(s) see informative Annex ZZ, which is an integral part of this document. __________ SIST EN 50553:2012

- 5 - EN 50553:2012 Introduction The purpose of this European Standard is to define requirements for running capability under fire conditions which are applicable to railway rolling stock with passengers, so that a train will be able to reach a "safe area" as defined in the Safety in Rail Tunnels TSI (TSI SRT) 1.1.3. Specifically, this standard is intended to clarify and rationalise the requirements for rolling stock running capability in the EN 45545 series (Operation Categories 2, 3 and 4) and in the TSI SRT (Fire Safety Categories A and B). It is also intended to define specific technical measures, compliance with which will allow a ‘Presumption of Conformity’ with the TSI SRT to be made by the Notified Body assessing the Rolling Stock. NOTE 1 In several cases it might appear that requirements are included which are duplicating requirements given in the EN 45545 series and/or which are dealt with in other ways by the EN 45545 series. This is not the intention and is not the case. The EN 45545 series introduces running capability functional requirements but does not generally define how they are to be met nor to what level of performance. Also, a number of requirements which are included in the EN 45545 series, would be relevant to, or suitable for, running capability use but are not identified for this use within the TS. It is therefore necessary to include requirements which are apparently duplicating the EN 45545 series in this standard but which actually do not duplicate the TS when examined in detail. If desired it should be possible, when converting EN 45545 to an EN, to include these requirements during the process which would allow them to be removed from this standard. Reference to Annex A shows that it is necessary for this standard specifically to address 4.2.5.5 of the TSI SRT. This standard considers the requirement to "improve the probability that a passenger train with a fire on board will continue to operate…" in a "reasonably practicable" context. It is understood that "train" includes all vehicles such as locomotives and power cars which are associated with the passenger vehicles. Requirements for running capability cannot be defined without a knowledge of other fire characteristics of the train, specifically its reaction to fire and fire resistance specification. The assumption is made that the fire standard applied is the EN 45545 series or any standard for which technical equivalence can be demonstrated. NOTE 2 In defining conditions to assure running capability it is only the intention to define requirements which allow the train to remain capable of controlled movement. The general safety level of the train when operating under these conditions (for example the level of lighting within the saloon) is not within the scope. Matters such as this are dealt with in other standards (including, but not limited to, the EN 45545 series). The standard defines requirements based on a philosophy which recognises that stopping a train is not itself a life-threatening event. It is therefore not required to have running capability for all fires; only those fires which may cause serious injury and/or develop to threaten life. For example, situations such as the combustion of an individual electrical component inside a technical cabinet meeting criteria for fire resistance in accordance with the EN 45545 series, do not attract running capability requirements under this standard. In a similar manner, if any fire is extinguished with no reignition during the relevant period of the incident, it is deemed that there is no longer a requirement for running capability and the train can be stopped (as if it was a non-safety threatening technical fault). These examples illustrate how the impracticability of addressing all thermal events that could stop a train is circumvented by the philosophy applied. Compliance with the running capability requirements for any relevant system function is derived from one or more of the following: – absence of a relevant fire; – assuring system function under the fire; – assuring system function for a redundant array under the fire; – extinguishing the fire; – assuring sufficient remaining Tractive Effort under the fire. SIST EN 50553:2012

- 7 - EN 50553:2012 1 Scope This European Standard defines requirements for running capability under fire conditions which are applicable to passenger carrying railway rolling stock. In particular, technical measures are specified, compliance with which will contribute to conformity with the Directive and the relevant Technical Specifications for Interoperability (TSI). The standard specifies the fire conditions: – for which it is not necessary to define running capability requirements as there is no significant potential for serious injury or threat to life; – for which it is reasonable to expect trains to continue to run in a controlled manner; – for which it is not reasonably practicable to define requirements which give complete assurance of running in a controlled manner, due to the exceptional nature of the fire incident. The TSI SRT defines running capability requirements in respect of fires within technical areas/equipment only. However for general guidance the scope of this standard is extended to include fires from non-technical causes within passenger/staff areas which may impact train system functions adjacent to and/or passing through the affected area. This extension of applicability significantly increases the number of system functions which are potentially at risk and therefore requires that the "reasonably practicable" principles be extended to this new condition.
The standard does not consider situations where a primary non-fire incident is likely to immobilise the train by definition; for example major mechanical defect leading to derailment, even when fire then occurs. 2 Normative references The following documents, in whole or in part, are normatively referenced in this document and are indispensable for its application. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. EN 3-7 +A1 2004 2007 Portable fire extinguishers  Part 7: Characteristics, performance requirements and test methods EN 54 Series Fire detection and fire alarm systems EN 403 2004 Respiratory protective devices for self-rescue  Filtering devices with hood for escape from fire  Requirements, testing, marking EN 15663 2009 Railway applications  Definition of vehicle reference masses CEN/TS 45545-1 2009 Railway applications  Fire protection on railway vehicles  Part 1: General CEN/TS 45545-2 2009 Railway applications  Fire protection on railway vehicles  Part 2: Requirements for fire behaviour of materials and components CEN/TS 45545-3 2009 Railway applications  Fire protection on railway vehicles  Part 3: Fire resistance requirements for fire barriers CEN/TS 45545-4 2009 Railway applications  Fire protection on railway vehicles  Part 4: Fire safety requirements for railway rolling stock design CLC/TS 45545-5 2009 Railway applications  Fire protection on railway vehicles  Part 5: Fire safety requirements for electrical equipment including that of trolley buses, track guided buses and magnetic levitation vehicles SIST EN 50553:2012

+ corr Oct. + A3 2002 2002 2005 2006 2006 Power transformer and reactor fittings  Part 5; Liquid level, pressure and flow indicators, pressure relief devices and dehydrating breathers EN 50362 2003 Method of test for resistance to fire of larger unprotected power and control cables for use in emergency circuits EN 60310 2004 Railway applications  Traction transformers and inductors on board rolling stock (IEC 60310:2004) EN 61034-1 2005 Measurement of smoke density of cables burning under defined conditions  Part 1: Test apparatus (IEC 61034-1:2005) EN ISO 15540 2001 Ships and marine technology  Fire resistance of hose assemblies  Test methods (ISO 15540:1999) IEC 60331-3 2009 Tests for electric cables under fire conditions  Circuit integrity  Part 3: Test method for fire with shock at a temperature of at least 830 °C for cables of rated voltage up to and including 0,6/1,0 kV tested in a metal enclosure ISO/TR 9705-2 2001 Reaction to fire tests  Full scale room tests for surface products  Part 2: Technical background and guidance 3 Terms and definitions For the purposes of this document, the following terms and definitions apply. 3.1 fire scenarios 3.1.1
type 1 fire fire which, due to its size and/or location, presents no significant risk of serious injury or threat to life and for which it is not necessary to define running capability requirements 3.1.2
type 2 fire fire which, due to its size and/or location, presents a risk of serious injury and/or threat to life and for which it is reasonably practicable to define running capability requirements 3.1.3
type 3 fire fire which, due to its size and/or location, presents a risk of serious injury and/or threat to life but for which it is not reasonably practicable to assure running capability SIST EN 50553:2012

- 9 - EN 50553:2012 3.1.4
reference Type 2 fire fire which has the power vs. time profile of Ignition source 5 of CEN/TS 45545-1; 75kW for 2 minutes followed by 150 kW for 8 min 3.2 electrical power supplies 3.2.1
supply line refer to CLC/TS 45545-5 3.2.2
traction circuit refer to CLC/TS 45545-5 3.2.3 auxiliary supplies 3.2.3.1
auxiliary circuit refer to CLC/TS45545-5 3.2.3.2
train power supply refer to CLC/TS45545-5 3.2.3.3
battery supply circuit refer to CLC/TS45545-5 3.3
equipment required for running capability parts of the equipment required to assure the system function required for running capability Note 1 to entry: For example, relevant parts of the brake system, control cables, power input and output cables, electrical/mechanical devices, the cooling circuit, auxiliary devices for feeding the blower motors and the air supply. 3.4
tractive effort (N) sum of all the traction forces between the train and the track 3.5
fire resistance terminology (examples) E15 and/or I15 are durations of Integrity (E) and Insulation (I) respectively Note 1 to entry: Refer to CEN/TS 45545-3:2009, 6.1. 3.6
relevant period of the incident period of the incident up to the time when the train has reached a "safe area" as defined in TSI SRT 1.1.3 3.7
system function (for equipment defined in 3.4) function of a system including all aspects of the command and control arrangements for the system 3.8
technical cabinet refer to CEN/TS 45545-6 3.9
decision box running capability compliancy test in Figure 1. The number of the Decision Box reflects its position in the flow chart cascade process SIST EN 50553:2012

redundant array arrangement whereby a system function is assured by two or more independent systems and which continues to be fully assured when one of the systems fails 3.11
running capability (in case of a fire on board) ability of a train to reach a "Safe Area" (TSI SRT 4.2.2.6.1) in case of a fire on board 3.12
degraded mode state whereby less than nominally 100% of the system function capability can be achieved 4 Symbols and abbreviated terms For the purposes of this document, the following symbols and abbreviations apply. TSI Technical Specification for Interoperability TSI SRT Safety in Railway Tunnels TSI (see Bibliography) TSI HS RST High Speed Rolling Stock TSI (see Bibliography) CFD Computational Fluid Dynamics ATP Automatic Train Protection m Design mass [kg] under payload according to EN 15663 t Time [s] g The vertical acceleration due to gravity; taken as 9,81 m.s-2. v0 Initial velocity [m.s-1] vlim Speed limit on the line [m.s-1] i Gradient of line [mm per m] ρ Curve radius of the line [m] x Distance from the beginning of the line under consideration to the position of the head of the train [m]; (thus i(x) and ρ(x)) lt Length of line under consideration [m] NOTE The length of the line under consideration is equal to the length of the structure, (for example tunnel or elevated structure), plus the length of the train. R(v) Running resistance as a function of velocity [N] a, b, c Coefficients ("a" [N]; "b" [Ns.m-1]; "c" [Ns2.m-2]) F(v) Tractive effort [N] between the train and the track as a function of velocity
Acceleration [m.s-2] Am The Optical Density as defined in EN 61034-1 SIST EN 50553:2012

- 11 - EN 50553:2012 5 Methodology 5.1 Principles It is not considered necessary to accommodate the spontaneous occurrence of two or more independent fires, therefore a single fire occurrence only shall be considered. The train is assumed to be in its normal operational state at the start of the analysis.
NOTE "Normal operational state" means that the train is assumed to have no defects which affect its running capability at the start of the analysis. In defining requirements for running capability with a fire on board the train, the following must be considered: – It is necessary to recognise that stopping a train is not, in itself, a life-threatening event and hence stopping a train with a fire which is either contained or will be extinguished, is also not life-threatening. Thus it is important only to define requirements for running capability for those fires which have the potential to cause serious injury and/or threaten life. – It is possible to imagine fire incidents of such severity, possibly a severe arson event or fuel related catastrophic equipment failure, that there is no significant probability of the train systems surviving and of the vehicle continuing to function. For such incidents it is not reasonably practicable to define requirements which will assure the running capability of the train. It should however be recognised that requirements defined to mitigate the effects for these incidents on a lesser scale, which will occur during the fire development towards the extreme scale, will have beneficial effects in these extreme cases but that these benefits are not at a defined level. Given these principles it is necessary to define a classification system for fires, as the nature of the fire needs to be known before any judgement in respect of practicability can be made. The various fires which may occur are therefore placed into one of three types as defined in 3.1. At some stage when considering fires and the sources of fire, specific pieces of equipment will be examined. It is necessary to recognise that it is possible for a piece of equipment to be both a source of fire as well as impacted by fire and that a clear distinction should be made between these two situations in the analysis. Annex E shows the clauses relevant to specific system functions. 5.2 Fire Classification Scheme 5.2.1 Type 1 Fires Typical Type 1 fires are Ignition Models 1-4 of CEN/TS 45545-1, Annex A and these ignition models, in the context of trains constructed to EN 45545, present no significant risk because they are not considered to be large enough to pose a risk in themselves and fire will not develop. Thus for Type 1 fires there are no running capability requirements. NOTE An example of a "no requirement" situation would be a fire within a small equipment case containing safety critical signalling equipment. The fire would be represented by CEN/TS 45545-1 Ignition model 4 and whilst the fire within the case would cause the signalling equipment to fail and hence cause the train to stop, the fire hazard will be very small generally either due to the containment afforded by the case or due to the flame retardant nature of the materials within the case. Both of these situations are defined under CEN/TS 45545-2. 5.2.2 Type 2 Fires Type 2 fire events are related, for example, to luggage fires, vandalised seat fires, some diesel fires and also to significant arson events. These fires present a significant risk but are of a scale such that it is reasonably practicable to define requirements for the protection of train system functions so as to assure a defined level of running capability. Thus for Type 2 fires: SIST EN 50553:2012

The possibility of a Type 3 fire does, however, require that provisions be put in place to deal with the Type 2 fire that will exist, however briefly, as the incident progresses to Type 3 fire status. It is reasonable to expect that the measures taken to assure running capability under the Type 2 fire conditions, which shall be applied to these fires, will be of some benefit for these Type 3 fires but the benefit is not at a defined level. Thus for Type 3 fires: There are no running capability requirements; i.e. none additional to those required by the included Type 2 fires as stated above, arising in respect of: – high power electrical faults on circuits which are not locally protected, electrically and by other means, according to EN 45545 – fully developed diesel (and other combustible fluid) fires resulting from failed equipment. 5.3 Application The logical basis for the application of running capability and hence for determining the state of compliancy in respect of Type 2 fires, is achieved by using the Figure 1. The flow chart should be used for each system function under consideration. When all relevant system functions have been considered and have been found to comply on an individual basis, the train is compliant. Users will commence their assessment at "Start" on the flow chart and enter Decision Box 1. If the analysis demonstrates that the system function under consideration is compliant with Decision Box 1; i.e. there is no Type 2 fire possible, the line followed is "No" to the "Compliant" end box. No further analysis needs to be done for that system function in respect of running capability. Decision Box 1 is an "existence test" for a Type 2 fire and guidance as to how to carry out this "existence test" is given in 6.2 and specifically in Figure 2. SIST EN 50553:2012

- 13 - EN 50553:2012 However, should the system function under consideration not be compliant with the analysis of Decision Box 1 it then enters into Decision Box 2. If the system function under consideration is compliant when analysed under Decision Box 2 the line followed is "Yes" down to the "Compliant" end box. No further analysis needs to be done for that system function in respect of running capability. However, if the system function under consideration is not compliant the analysis enters into Decision Box 3 and on failure at this box it would continue into Decision Box 4 and if, again, not compliant, ultimately Decision Box 5 is reached. Compliance at any of Decision Boxes 1-4 stops the process and determines that the system function under consideration is acceptable. If this situation is established for all system functions under consideration then the train is acceptable for operation on any network to which the standard is applicable. Compliance at Decision Box 5 for any system function, (which is reached only after failure at Decision Boxes 1-4 inclusive), determines that the train is acceptable only for operation on routes for which the Tractive Effort calculation has been performed and found to be compliant. Finally, a "No" at Decision Box 5 for any system function determines that the train is not compliant. NOTE 1 Other than for Decision Box 5 the order of the Decision Boxes does not determine a "preferred" order or hierarchy of effectiveness. SIST EN 50553:2012

Can the system functionbe impacted by a Type 2fireIs there a compliant firefighting system.StartCompliantIs the individual systemfunction compliant.Does the system functionform part of a compliantredundant array.Does the degraded modecomply with the TractiveEffort requirements.NoYesNoNoYesYesYesYesNoRedesignDecision Box 1Decision Box 2Decision Box 3Decision Box 4Decision Box 5NoVerification ofComplianceClause 6.2Verification ofComplianceClause 6.3Verification ofComplianceClause 6.4Verification ofComplianceClause 6.5Verification ofComplianceClause 6.6
Figure 1  Decision box flow chart The temperature/time profile to which the equipment is subjected as a consequence of the Type 2 fire profile will therefore vary dependent on the exact fire profile adopted and also on the installed condition which includes aspects of design, materials and fixings.
- 15 - EN 50553:2012 NOTE 2 These various factors will affect the way in which the heat output of the fire profile is realised as temperatures at the equipment. The temperature/time profile may be calculated from, for example, CFD approaches or may be determined experimentally amongst others. 6 Verification of compliance 6.1 Specific requirements 6.1.1 Control & communication In the absence of a defined operational protocol, neither the ATP nor system-applied emergency braking shall be overridden for reasons associated with running capability under fire conditions. 6.1.2 Auxiliary equipment The battery supply to all battery-operated auxiliaries required for running capability shall provide sufficient power for a minimum period of 15 min. 6.1.3 Fire Fighting Systems If fire fighting systems (not necessarily used for running capability reasons) are installed, contamination by the extinguishing agent shall not impact other unaffected system functions so as to cause other ignition events and hence compromise the basis of the assurance of running capability and/or extinguishment. Specifically, where there is the potential for the extinguishing medium to come into contact with electric circuits which are either required for running capability or may give rise to additional hazards if short-circuited, media with low electrical conductivity shall be chosen. This requirement for electrical installations, where there is automatic extinguishing and where short-circuit of any equipment at the time of discharge may result in a new ignition source, is that the conductivity of the medium shall be less than 5 × 10-6 S.m-1. The equipment which is combusting and which is the subject of the fire fighting system discharge, is not required to continue to function (and generally power to this equipment would be removed before discharge of the fire fighting system). NOTE The intention is that the discharge does not cause problems with equipment which is not combusting. 6.1.4 Transformers and inductances Transformers and inductances shall be type tested in accordance with EN 60310. The cooling medium shall be type K according to EN 60310:2004, 7.1. 6.2 Decision Box 1 - Existence of a Type 2 (or Type 3) fire 6.2.1 General In deciding whether a Type 2 fire is possible (and can impact system function) all of the following sites/sources shall be considered: – diesel fuel and other combustible fluids; – brought in material; defined as luggage placed/stored in accordance with operational rules; – a vandalised seat. In deciding whether a Type 3 fire is possible (and can impact system function) all of the following sites/sources shall be considered: – high power electrical faults on circuits which are not locally protected, electrically and by other means, according to EN 45545; – fully developed diesel (and other combustible fluid) fires resulting from failed equipment. The methodology for assessment relevant to this Decision Box 1 is given in Figure 2 (Decision Box 1 SIST EN 50553:2012

- 17 - EN 50553:2012 Identify system functionsrelevant for runningcapability in accordance withthe applicable regulationLocate products andequipment relevant to theidentified system functionsLocate Type 2 (and Type 3)fire sourcesIn areas equipped with dieselengines or high power equipmentnot locally protected, electricallyand by other means, according toEN 45545Can the systemfunction beimpacted?In passenger areasLuggageplaced/stored inaccordance withoperationalprotocolsVandalised seaton the floorin luggage stackin luggage rackon the seat Figure 2  Decision box 1 flow chart SIST EN 50553:2012

6.2.2 Exclusions 6.2.2.1 Transformers and inductances Insulation liquid cooled transformers or inductances which comply with all of the following (a-c inclusive) and where the liquid complies with CEN/TS 45545-2, shall not be considered as a source of Type 2 / Type 3 fires.
a) Line current: To protect the transformer or the line inductance from internal failure there shall be: – protection based on the rate of change of the primary current of the transformer (differential protection) and – earth fault detection on the line inductance which cause the main circuit breaker to open. There shall be a protection device which causes the main circuit breaker to turn off the current in accordance with the over-current strategy of the traction control system function. On dual voltage traction systems (AC and DC) when operating under DC supply, there shall be a means of monitoring the state of any AC main circuit breaker so that if it fails to isolate the supply to the transformer, the pantograph is lowered. b) Overpressure in the transformer or inductance tank: There shall be an over-pressure valve which protects the tank from rupture arising from a catastrophic internal failure. The value of the pressure at which the valve operates shall be consistent with the tank design and shall be subject to type test. The outlet from the overpressure valve shall not be local to potential sources of ignition. There shall be an over-pressure switch which, on activation, opens the main circuit breaker. The pressure at which this activates shall be such that for all non-catastrophic internal failures no fluid is released from the over-pressure valve. The overpressure valve shall be in accordance with EN 50216-5:2002/A2:2005, Clause 6. NOTE 1 The activation pressure of the over-pressure switch is typically 0,2 bar less than the pressure at which the over-pressure valve operates. c) Temperature & flow monitoring of the insulation liquid: There shall be a means of monitoring the temperature and ensuring the flow of the insulation liquid. If the rate of flow is sufficient to ensure accurate measurement of insulation liquid temperature then the power should be managed in accordance with the temperature control strategy for the transformer or inductance. The temperature control strategy, including start up in cold temperatures, shall comprise: – control of the tractive effort so the limit temperature of the insulation liquid is not exceeded, and – isolating the transformer from the high power source if the temperature-rise limit of the insulation liquid is reached. If the rate of flow is insufficient to ensure accurate measurement of insulation liquid temperature then the power should be shut down by isolating the transformer from the high power source. NOTE 2 The limit temperature and the temperature-rise limit are described in 8.2 of EN 60310:2004. SIST EN 50553:2012

- 19 - EN 50553:2012 6.2.2.2 Diesel fuel and other combustible fluids Due to the potential for diesel fuel and/or combustible lubricating oil to generate a Type 3 fire all of the following requirements, designed to control the availability of diesel fuel and/or combustible lubricating oil, shall be met. NOTE 1 The requirements should be included in CEN/TS 45545-7 during the conversion to EN status, at which point they can be removed from this standard. – Hoses, pipes and their connections shall be protected from failure arising from thermal effects due to hot equipment (for example exhaust pipes), that could result in leakage of combustible fluid. – When designing hoses, pipes and their connections attention shall be given to the potential for failure arising from mechanical vibration, impact or fatigue; for example spacing of pipe clamps/supports and use of conical couplings with environmentally suitable rubber rings. – The bulk of any sound absorbing or heat insulating panels near the engine shall have a surface which does not change its reaction to fire classification as a result of absorbing any combustible fluids with which they may come into contact. – When an engine is shut down by removing the supply of fuel from the fuel tank there shall be no other means by which the engine can be supplied with fuel. NOTE 2 For example, two engines supplied from the same fuel tank shall not share the same fuel return piping back to the tank. 6.2.2.3 Pantographs and related equipment Pantographs and equipment between the pantograph and the main circuit breaker shall not be considered as a possible source of a Type 2 fire. 6.2.2.4 Luggage storage Any volume used for the placement of luggage in accordance with the operational protocol which is less than 0,55 m x 0,35 m x 0,25 m in any orientation shall not be considered as a possible source of a Type 2 fire. 6.3 Decision Box 2 - Individual system function 6.3.1 General Having established that a system function can potentially be impacted by a Type 2 fire ("Yes"; Decision Box 1), it is then required to ascertain whether the system function is robust against the impact of the fire. There are two routes to compliance: – compliance by test or – compliance by assessment. If compliance can be shown under Decision Box 2 then the Tractive Effort available will be nominally 100 %. 6.3.2 Compliance by test 6.3.2.1 Cables Compliance in respect of cables associated with the system function under consideration for running capability is assured if one of the following conditions is met: – they achieve 15 min circuit integrity under EN 50200, EN 50362 or IEC 60331-3 (as appropriate); – they are thermally protected such that the circuits relevant for running capability in the assembly achieve 15 minutes circuit integrity under EN 50200 or EN 50362 (as appropriate). SIST EN 50553:2012

- 21 - EN 50553:2012 An air reservoir which is required for running capability shall maintain its function fo
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